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‘[A] single word (and only a word) can tie or untie
a fate…’
Jeanne Favret-Saada (1980: 9)
 
Cutting the name
1 ‘W-w-w-what is his name, again?’ Mukunda Da asked me with stuttered urgency, his eyes
wide and freckled by the lamplight dancing across the room.
2 It was a late winter night in Burha Mayong village. My laptop battery was dead once
again, drained from a few hours without electrical current. Earlier, Mukunda Da and I had
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been passing the time watching a film, She’s so Lovely (Nick Cassavetes 1997). While doing
triple-duty of viewer, translator, and cultural interpreter, I was having a difficult time
explaining the film’s narrative arc. Here was a dark love story that was about as rough as
a Bukowski novel in its exploration of addiction, sickness, violence, and longing. Needless
to say, our conversation digressed.
3 ‘His name is Sean Penn… He is a famous actor in America.’ I tried to recount everything I
knew about Sean Penn, but before I could cook up a good story worthy of the cult of
celebrity,  Mukunda  Da  leaned in  and scolded  me with a  half-sarcastic,  half-terrified
riposte.
4 ‘O Sean bhaiti…you cannot speak his name. You must call him mita (friend). […] You share
his name, and it is dishonorable to call him ‘Sean’; just speak ‘mita’ to him. Let’s forget it…
[laughs] now pay a fine!’
5  ‘Why?’ I asked as I rummaged through my bag to remove my digital recorder and turn it
on. ‘I have never met him and he is not my friend. He is an actor in Hollywood.’
6  ‘He is your mita and you are his… honor him (xonman di dibo). It is bad practice (beya kam)
to speak his name… this rule of mita-mita… this rule of ‘cutting the name’ (nam to kati ase)…
is to give honor; we do not call our mita by name. Such is forbidden (nixiddho) in Assam.’
7  The deed was done; I broke a taboo, albeit a seemingly minor one. But it was a taboo so
rare that, before then, it was hidden in plain sight. As Mukunda Da explained, individuals
who share personal names are forbidden from addressing or referring to each other by
name, and instead must verbally interpellate each other as mita, meaning ‘friend.’
8 Flushed  with  an  ethnographer’s  vanity,  I  quickly  rejoined,  ‘I  don’t  understand…for
example, if my name is Mukunda and I say to you, ‘O Mukunda, how are you?’, then why is
that forbidden? What would happen if we share the same name?’
9  Ever the moralist, Mukunda Da responded in an increasingly solemn tone, ending with a
short list of obligations I have to Mr. Penn and our shared name:
There is no problem if you do not recognize me (muk sini na pai je digdar na hobo),
but you are my brother now, you are a man of Mayong, so you will be shamed (las
lagibo)… [and] I will be frightened… [because I will then think] why does my mita
speak my name? Maybe you have bad thoughts of me, maybe you want to harm me;
nobody addresses his mita by name. Names are powerful,  and you know what a
sorcerer  (bej)  can  do  with  someone’s  name.  The  name  must  be  honored,…
protected,… [and so] you must honor your mita always.
***
10 Transgressive action leading to contemplative revelation: the trope is familiar enough.
One  may  recall,  for  example,  Alfred  Gell’s  (1979: 134–35)  taboo-breaking  experience
among the Umeda of New Guinea. Upon cutting his finger and unconsciously sucking the
blood from the wound, Gell breached a fundamental—and thus unmentionable—taboo:
auto-cannibalism.1 Yet, only in light of his transgression was Gell able to articulate the
structural features and congeners of Umeda selfhood that were otherwise inarticulable in
ordinary, reflexive language use. As it is for the clueless ethnographer, so it is too for the
Umeda hunter who ‘lapses’ into unreflective carnal action, and is in turn put into place by
taboo—the  contemplative  position  that  restores  his  ego  and  renews  him  for  future
activity in the world.
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11  In this paper, I proceed from the dialectic of transgression and containment observed by
Gell to reflect on my own lapse into tabooed speech, and on name sharing in Mayong
more generally.2 In what follows, I analyze the place of personal names in acts of sorcery
and magic, a baptism ceremonial, and nominal modes of address in Mayong to present
some first steps toward an ethnographic theory of what a shared name is and what its
taboo implies for relations of conspecificity.
12 My argument is that, in Mayong, confronting a person with the same personal name is
tantamount to confronting one’s own singular destiny in another body and another time.
Names and persons here are meant to have a telic identity. Or better stated, Mayongians
wish that names and the persons who bear them will become one and the same over a
lifetime. This wish is partly normative aspiration and partly a result of the cosmological
pre-determination of personal names. Thus, when a subject transgresses the taboo on
shared name utterances, she bespeaks her own past or future—her own life—in a body
beyond her control. For Mayongians, this presents a philosophical and moral puzzle: is
the ‘self’ confronted in the ‘other’ a result of independent actions and intentions, or a
shared, cosmologically determined destiny?
13 Name  sharers  seem to  solve  this  puzzle  in  practice  by  following  what  Mukunda  Da
referred to as the ‘rule of mita-mita,’ or using ‘friend’ as a euphemistic term of address.
This solution, however, raises another puzzle for anthropologists. If taboo containment is
generally understood as a method for creating distance from threatening substances (see
below),  then  why  does  correcting  this  taboo  seem  to  move  closer  in  intimacy  and
permissiveness to the bearer of the taboo? After all, friendship is, ostensibly, a rather
intimate and flexible social bond. To attempt an answer, I propose that the name-sharing
taboo clarifies what friendship actually is in Mayong. But it does so somewhat obliquely
in that its transgression—addressing my name sharer by name—implies a kind of mutual
destiny  more  closely  aligned  with  the  logics  and  practices  of  kinship.  Hence  taboo
containment further clarifies the limits of that gray area—a bane of anthropologists—
where  kinship  bleeds  into  friendship  and  vice  versa.  Ultimately,  the  taboo  sets  a
boundary via negative definition: kinship is what friendship is not.
14 At least potentially so. For it is not so much that the rule of mita-mita ultimately solves
the  philosophical  puzzle  described  above.  Rather,  it  reframes  it  more  concretely  by
prompting a code for action: that is my name, but that is not my body—what obligations
do I have with that person, what do I enjoin and what do I cut?
***
15 This puzzle between nominal identity and bodily difference takes us to the heart of taboo
theory. On one hand, as far as current anthropological and psychoanalytic theories would
have it,  the  enforcement  of  taboos  is  a  means  of  constituting an embodied subject—a
corporeally whole, self-aware person. By creating a safe distance between a body and a
symbolically threatening external object or action, taboos protect the integrity of the
subject  by preventing the disintegration of  the body in which it  necessarily must be
located.3
16 On the other hand, a sometimes explicit addendum to this theoretical closure is that
taboos cease to be operative when subjects are figured transcendent—as Kant or Christian
theologians might have it—i.e.,  disembodied, referenced in speech or name alone, and
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thereby  distanced  from  the  external  dangers  (especially  other  bodies)  that  would
otherwise  put  the  subject  at  risk  (Valeri  2000: 113).  Of  course,  this  in  turn  begs  an
ethnographic rejoinder: whence name utterance taboos? And serious ones at that? For
Mukunda Da, my verbal transgression implied a very real threat of physical harm, a fear
of the unknown intentions of other bodies lurking behind a name. While it is obvious that
speech is always an embodied action, the question of why a name avoidance taboo would
have implications on the integrity of one’s body is worth investigating further.
17 Thus, before returning to the ethnography at hand, it is useful to clear some conceptual
ground. Although a distinction between unmentionable and untouchable things might
not make much difference to Mukunda Da—or matter at all when it comes to the logics
and practices of  Mayongian naming in general—it certainly has made a difference in
anthropological theory.
 
The unmentionable and the untouchable
18 An irony of the subject of name avoidance taboos in anthropological theory is that they
are both everywhere and nowhere. At the foundation of anthropology as a comparative
social  science—a  science  that  non-anthropologists  were  actually  interested  in—name
avoidance practices were a rich source of theoretical insight and debate (Benveniste 1971,
Frazer 1996, Freud 1918, Haddon 1935, Wittgenstein 1993). It is only recently that name
taboos have reappeared in the literature as phenomena of theoretical concern, prompting
useful  insights  into  the  (meta)pragmatic  efficacy  of  speech  avoidance  in  general
(Fleming 2011, Fleming & Lempert 2011, Lempert & Silverstein 2013, Stasch 2011). Among
other things, this literature demonstrates that, as a token of the verbal taboo type, name
avoidance  taboos  are  curiously  inflexible.  They  have  an  almost  crushing  logic  of
referential and performative fixity, allowing for their transgression and containment to
accrue more power to the proscription itself, making it socially productive.4
19  Accordingly, it is not surprising that name avoidance taboos populate the comparative
ethnographic record. But this makes it all the more ironic that their elaboration has not
contributed explicitly to a general theory of taboo. Major, path-breaking works on taboo
theory in the twentieth century—Lévi-Strauss (1966, 1969), Gell (1979), Douglas (1966),
Leach  (1964),  Valeri  (2000),  Kristeva  (1982)—all  focus  rather  exclusively  on  the
particularities of the untouchable rather than the unmentionable. My question here is:
can we bring the particularities of the unmentionable back into a general theory of taboo,
but this time with one that has embodiment as an integrative feature?
20 In anthropology, one has to go back to Frazer, for better or worse, to begin carving out an
answer. Frazer’s original hypothesis as to why name utterances are widely prohibited
centers on the threat of injury by magic: ‘[name taboos] originate in a reluctance to utter
the real names of persons addressed or directly referred to. That reluctance is probably
based on a dread of revealing the name to sorcerers, who would thereby obtain a handle
for injuring the owner of a name’ (Frazer 1996: 334). Personal names, for Frazer, act as a
kind of  mimetic  or  sympathetic  label,  an  indexical  icon that  a  sorcerer  can use  for
transmitting lethal or harmful magic in a situation where there may or may not be co-
presence.  We  might  call  this,  following  Fleming  and Lempert  (2011: 7),  a  ‘hazard  of
addressivity.’ For mentioning an unmentionable name is not simply a matter of saying
too  much,  but  of  ushering  an  addressee—an  embodied  subject—into  existence  (and,
moreover, if not the inevitable death of that subject,5 then at least its vulnerability). In
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this sense, physical co-presence need not be direct or immanent to an interaction—or to
what Goffman (1981) refers to as a ‘participation framework’—for this hazard to unfold.
21 In  this  light,  we  might  also  reconsider  ‘untouchability’  via  Freud’s  (1918: 33)  rather
valuable insights into what taboos against ‘touching’ actually imply:
As in the case of taboo the nucleus of the neurotic prohibition is the act of touching,
whence we derive the name touching phobia, or délire de toucher. The prohibition
extends not only to direct contact with the body but also to the figurative use of the
phrase  as  ‘to  come  into  contact,’  or  ‘be  in  touch  with  someone  or  something.’
Anything that leads the thoughts to what is prohibited and thus calls forth mental
contact is just as much prohibited as immediate bodily contact; this same extension
is also found in taboo.
22 On one hand, Freud’s psychoanalytic argument is useful for figuring embodiment richly,
as a matter of vicarious contact (even mental or spoken). On the other hand, for Freud,
speaking and thinking are essentially  metaphors for touching.  It  is  ultimately bodily
contact,  in  its  promise  of  immediacy,  that  grounds  taboo.  I  would  propose,  on  the
contrary, that we can locate embodiment as a defining feature of unmentionable taboos
in the ethnographically salient ways that bodies, names, and speech are all integrative
elements of a richly defined subjectivity. A good place to start—as it was with Frazer—is
in sorcery and magic as an ethnographic explicans.
 
The depth of magic
23 Sorcery is something Mayong is, coincidentally or not, most famous for. Rumors circulate
across Northeast India—and now across much of the sub-continent—of Mayong being a
center of dangerous black magic, inhabited by sorcerers (bej) who can inflict harm or
manipulate  one’s  intentions  from a  distance.  In  Assam,  it  is  not  uncommon to  hear
Mayong  referred  to  jadur  dex  (country  of  magic)  or  bhoyonkor  dex  (country  of  fear/
danger), a place where anyone could be a potential victim or practitioner of sorcery. To
the point, Mayongians are quick to remark that whether or not one believes in sorcery, it
nevertheless exists as a social-cum-economic reality, efficacious and easily caught up in.
Indeed, throughout Assam, healing and harming through preternatural means is one of
the fastest growing industries around.
24 For our purposes here, it is important to recall Mukunda Da’s lesson to me: ‘you know
what  a  sorcerer  (bej)  can  do  with  a  name.’  Sorcerers  in  Mayong,  and  throughout
Northeast India, use names much like they use bodily substances—hair, fingernails, saliva,
etc. All are sympathetic vehicles that are especially good for directing assault sorcery (ban
, lit. ‘arrows’) toward an intended victim or, alternatively, curing someone suffering from
a chronic illness. The phonemes-cum-lexemes of one’s name are not innocent particulars;
they are particulate bits of cosmological data that serve as a guidemap for a sorcerer who
then  can  access  and  interpret  parts  of  a  person’s  destiny  (bhagyo)  and  bio-moral
composition  simply  by  reading  them.6 For  acts  of  assault  sorcery,  once  that  data  is
accessed it is not only an individual who becomes a victim, but indirectly anyone who is a
conspecific in terms of shared substance, like the blood of kin, the food of feast sharers,
the rice beer of the ancestors, the title of a patriclan, or the name of a name sharer. The
threat  of  contagion (khoti)  is,  among other things,  why Mayongians take care not  to
become caught up in sorcery logic and practice,  and take precautions to contain and
manage substances that a sorcerer—or any other precarious being—might find of use.
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25 Early on in my fieldwork, I decided to consult a local sorcerer and noted astrologer, Sri
Prabin Saikia, about a chronic sleeping problem I have suffered from throughout my life.
During  the  consultation,  Prabin  Da  only  asked  me  three  questions:  first,  when  the
sleeping problem began; second, if I would write out the letters of my entire name (in
English and Assamese); and third, if I would write the date, day, and time of my birth. I
began by saying that my parasomnia started when I was a young teenager, probably 12 or
13 years old. Uncertain how to properly transliterate my name phoneme by phoneme at
the time, I wrote the following:














87      
26 Before I could write the details of my birth, Prabin Da looked at the phonemes of my
name and remarked quite casually that I  have been bothered and manipulated by an
aggressive, headless bhut (ghost, spirit)—called a murkond—most of my life. He said I must
have  disturbed  his  home,  a  tree  on  the  eastern  side  of  my  house,  sometime  in  my
childhood. Borrowing my sensory faculties that night, the murkond heard someone call
out my name (‘tur nam to xunisile’) and became ‘stuck’ to it (‘gotike namot logai dise’). Yet,
only being able to perceive the world through my minimal senses when I slept (ears,
closed eyes, and nose), the murkond developed evil eye (beya soku).7 Singlemindedly, it
followed me across  the  world  causing  fits  of  sleeplessness  and  terror  wherever  and
whenever I dozed off.
27 When the consultation was over and a remedy for removing the murkond was applied, I
asked Prabin Da how he had come to know all of this from my name. Knowing a little
about how names are selected in Mayong at that point (see below), I told him that my
mother chose my name arbitrarily without ritual divination or astrological consultation.
He said it didn’t matter, that it was built into my bhagyo. I learned that my name contains
phonemes associated with general divinity (deo) and the planet/god Saturn (Xoni [Shani])
—hence forces (both positive and negative) easily ‘magnetize’ (okorxon kore) to me. I was,
in so many words, a vulnerable name/body. The forces I attract, and thus the parasitical
bond with the murkond, were all created independently of anyone’s intentions, wishes, or
potential divinations.
28 In Mayong, at least, there is some ethnographic evidence to support Frazer’s hypothesis.
Not only sorcerers but hostile bhut can access a life through a revealed name. For the
murkond, however, the attachment to my name was not intentional. It was only through
using my body that it could actually hear my name. (Being headless, murkond have no
sense of sound.) Effectively, the murkond was as much a victim of my name’s phonetic
magnetism as I will always be. Here we have this almost subjectless, flatly tactile being
who is only able to sense the world through my body yet doubly trapped by (1) only being
able to access it when I sleep and, (2) being perpetually ‘stuck’ to my name—not by its
own choice, but by forces that, although immanent in my name, were transcendent and
stronger than either of our bodies or intentions. Unintentional magic built this bond, and
intentional magic broke it.
29 This image articulates exactly what is at stake for a more general theory of taboo that can
bridge  the  unmentionable  and  untouchable  divide.  The  locus  of  the  event  is  an
integrative subject, of which body, speech, and name are parts of a whole and contain the
whole within them. As stated before, name utterance ushers in a vulnerable, embodied
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subject as an unavoidable ‘hazard of addressivity.’ But there are more entailments. It also
ushers in the forces that constitute that subject, and also other bodies (like the murkond
or crafty sorcerers) that can put it at risk or set it straight. We could say, then, that taboo
ultimately constitutes not just embodied, but cosmological subjects.
30  We would do well, then, to counter Frazer’s hypothesis by asking not just what a name
and its utterance does, but what they mean in an entire cosmology of other forces, bodies,
and signs. Unfortunately, what a name actually means for Frazer is only implied in his
statement  that  a  person  is  an  ‘owner’  of  a  name.  The  assumption  that  names  are
properties  (something  owned  and  something  distinguishing)  is  also  shared  by
Wittgenstein whose challenge to Frazer was, characteristically, to make the connection
between magic and naming taboos universally logical: ‘Why should it not be possible for a
person to regard his own name as sacred? It is certainly, on the one hand, the most
important instrument which is given to him, and, on the other, like a piece of jewelry
hung around his neck at birth’ (Wittgenstein 1993: 126–27).
31 Sacred, instrumental, precious, emblematic, inciteful of jealousy? Of course. Names can
have all these values, in Mayong and elsewhere. But I would press Wittgenstein further on
his related position that ‘the depth of magic must be preserved’ (Wittgenstein 1993: 116).
Magic not only ‘expresses a wish’ (Wittgenstein 1993: 126), it also acts as an access point
into deep cosmological possibilities, into forces bigger and beyond ourselves—and this
independent of our wishes. One of these possibilities—let’s call it a cosmologic—is that
rather than a name belonging to me, I might actually ‘belong to a name.’8
32 Mayongians  embrace this  cosmologic  of  nominal  precedence  and  mobilize  it  most
explicitly  in  the  ritual  contexts  where  personal  names  are  selected  and  given.
Accordingly, I turn now to describe a baptismal ceremonial, or oxus, in which personal
names are given in Burha Mayong village. Since it was in conversation with a Plains Karbi
elder (Mukunda Da) that I first encountered the name sharing taboo, I will focus only on
the  oxus of  this  community,  but  I  should  also  note  that  the  rituals  of  name-giving
ceremonials in Assam (and throughout Mayong) are as diverse as the surfeit of ethnic
groups that enact them.
The Plains Karbi oxus and the cosmological singularity
of personal names
33 For the Plains Karbi community in Burha Mayong, oxus (oxusiya nam;  xusikoron) refers
doubly to a given condition of impurity (suwa) and the ritual actions that transform this
condition:  protection,  purification,  and  name-giving  (namokoron).  Infants  are  the
predominant subject of this ceremonial (usually conducted twelve weeks after birth), but
they are not the only ones who undergo it. Anyone who wishes (or is fated) to enter the
society  (i.e.,  to  become  Karbi)—due  to  marriage,  birth,  or  ethnic  conversion—must
complete most,  if  not all,  the rites of  the oxus ceremonial.  In effect,  oxus accomplish
something radical. As Philippe Ramirez (2013: 65) brilliantly notes,
In  several  Northeastern  cultures,  ‘purification’  should  be  understood  as
‘transformation.’ […] The forms taken by this purification evokes that of classical
Hinduism, as  well  as  the universal  concerns about social  pollution.  Its  function,
however, is the opposite of Hindu purifications […] whereas Hindu purification re-
establishes a limit after removing the external agent, here it enables [the foreign
agent] to move into the group.
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The implication for childhood oxus is that the infant is like a stranger, to be incorporated
into local society (raiz) through transformative rites of purification and name-giving. Oxus
are thus baptismal in a rather literal sense. This will become clearer as I proceed. In what
follows, I outline some ritual features for childhood oxus that sufficiently ground what I
will call the ‘cosmological singularity’ of a personal name.
34 The first rite of the ceremonial involves a bit of trickery on the part of the Karbi raiz. Male
elders of the patriclan begin the ritual by fashioning two child-like dolls out of straw in
the family’s courtyard (see Figure 1). The dolls are fashioned to be ersatz host bodies for
daini (witches, evil spirits) who would otherwise harm the child by attaching themselves
to the real child’s body in its vulnerable state. While these dolls are being constructed,
female elders  of  the patriclan prepare an elaborate display of  areca nut  (tamol),  pan
leaves, tumeric, incense, and cut cloth to drape the dolls in—a feast and presentation to
entice the daini to possess the dolls instead of the child.
 
Figure 1.
Men of a patriclan fashion straw dolls as host bodies for daini (witches, evil spirits) who might harm
the child in its pre-named state, or, worse, use the vulnerable child’s body as a host out of jealousy for
wanting of a name. Daini are nameless spirits, evil in intention, and jealous in rapport. Throughout
Assam—especially among the Bodo community—they are considered to be female in gender.
35 Concurrently, the mother, father, and infant initiate are led to the edge of the forested
hills at the rear boundary of the village where the fresh water streams emerge from the
jungle. There, the village high priest (rongbong kathar), erects an arch (bir) made from two
young bamboo stalks, and places each stalk on opposing banks of a stream (Figure 2). A
small basket, also made from bamboo, is hung from the cross-section of the arch, and an
egg from a hen (from the household belonging to the infant undergoing the ceremony) is
placed inside of it. The mother, father, and child (held by the mother) collectively pass
through the arch (bir kilut in Karbi, kath kore in Assamese) clockwise, father first and wife/
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child second, thus stepping in and out of the water each time. All the while, the rongbong
kathar recites mantras of purification and anoints the family with basil water (tuloxi pani)




The current rongbong kathar, Nileshur Ingti, prepares the bir (bamboo arch) for the purification ritual of
‘passing through the arch.’
36 This circuit is completed, ideally, nine times—a cosmo-numerical constant in most Karbi
rites. The ‘passing under the arch’ serves two purposes: (1) to remove all pollution (suwa)
from the child and her parents (thus protecting the patriclan and tribe from potential
transmission of  inauspiciousness or dangerous substances associated with childbirth),
and (2) to prepare the child for social transformation into a Karbi person.
37 A quick note:  before the completion of an oxus,  the child lacks jati.9 While it  is most
commonly the case that a child is a reincarnated ancestor from the same patriclan, there
are dozens of instances where this has not been the case. Either way, the origin of the
child’s atma (‘life substance’) remains indeterminate until divination rites are completed
to determine who this child previously was (usually one year after the oxus). In this sense,
the  infant  initiate  is  rather  like  Georg  Simmel’s  (1971)  ‘stranger’—in  but  not  of  the
society,  socially  distant  yet  physically  close.  In  Burha  Mayong,  she  fits  (at  least
temporarily) into a class that unites wives, the line of kings, uxorilocal male sorcerers,
and converted Karbi—all  outsiders  who have come to stay,  yet  keep one foot  in the
society and one outside of it.
38 Once the circuit is complete, the rongbong kathar breaks down the bamboo arch, removes
the egg from its basket, and after constructing a ritual space on the ground (a nine point
mandala  made of  pitha  guri [rice  flour]),  he  proceeds  to  break the egg with a  knife,
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‘cutting’  it  and  pouring  its  contents  over  the  mandala.  This  rite  is  understood as  a
sanctioned sacrifice:  ‘cutting in the name of  god’  (bhagabhanor  nam loi  katise).  Before
cutting the egg, the rongbong kathar recites a shlok, asking the egg for forgiveness. Using
the intimate toi form of  address,  he announces ‘O little  egg!  Please do not  take this
slaughter as an injustice. You need not think of your sacrifice as death [as a life that has
been ‘cut’]. God has given this sacrifice his blessing in the past so another might live now.’
He then recites the name of the household god (Hemphu in Karbi; Mahadeu in Assamese)
to nullify the sinful transgression (mahapap) of egg sacrifice.10
39 A short divination rite concerning the family’s collective destiny follows, which involves
the following: first, prostrating in the four cardinal directions; second, placing nine strips
of tamol (areca nut) bark, nine drops of lau pani (rice beer), and nine (inauspicious and
inedible) tips of pan leaf onto the rice flour mandala (and over the broken egg); and third,
cutting the bamboo container used during the bir kilut rite in half lengthwise, spilling its
water onto the mandala, and then rubbing the halves together before dropping them
three times onto the mandala. The way the bamboo halves fall  (outside or inside up,
crossed, not touching, etc.) is supposed to divine the collective destiny of a patriline now
that the child is becoming a part of it.
40  After these rites are completed,  the rongbong kathar returns to the courtyard of  the
child’s house with the lau gourd (xorbong in Karbi, see Figure 3) that held the rice beer
from the previous rite. From it, he bathes a red cock with ablutions of rice beer before
sacrificing it to the household deity. The cock’s blood is spilled over a set of sacred objects
contained in a banana leaf, and arranged around another cosmic map made of rice flour
(another nine point mandala, notably with the xorbong at the zenith, holding the rice beer
necessary to complete all  rituals and, in turn, symbolizing the ‘containment’ of Karbi
society as a whole).
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The rongbong kathar then ‘reads’ the grooves and color of the cock’s intestines to find
auspicious letters (phonemes-cum-lexemes) that should compose the child’s name and
determine her life course (Figure 4). The rongbong kathar refers to this act as ‘acquiring
the child’s destiny’ (puwalir bhagyo to paise).
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Figure 4.
The rongbong kathar divines phonemes/lexemes for the child’s name from the grooves and color of
the cock’s removed intestines.
41 Immediately following the divination, the intestines are placed before the child-like dolls,
now clothed and placed on a tray with the other objects of display laid around them
(tumeric, tamol, etc.). The dolls—now inhabited by the daini—are then carried by the elder
women of  the  patriclan  out  to  the  rice  fields  or  into  the  forest,  beyond the  village
settlement. While carrying the dolls away, the women sweep the ground ahead of them
and beat sticks against fences, tree trunks, and the external walls of the house, shouting
at the daini: ‘Go! Eat! Away from the house!’ (Figure 5). Once the daini have been chased
away, the child is then taken indoors in order to finalize what name she will receive.
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Figure 5.
With the dolls now possessed by the daini (witches, evil spirits), the women of the patriclan take them
out to the rice paddy field behind the home of the family hosting the oxus. Dogs eagerly await to feast
on the cock entrails.
42 With purifications complete and protections in place, the senior chief (bor bangthai) now
consults with family members about the date and time of birth, and other astrological
events  relating  to  the  child’s  conception,  birth,  development,  etc.  The chiefly  act  of
choosing the right personal name is a delicate process. Most of the time, the parents have
already picked out a name, but the chief can only approve if the name meets a minimal
set of requirements: (1) that the name contains the phonemes divined from the shape and
color of the sacrificed cock’s intestines and from other cosmic events coincidental with
birth—the name has to ‘fit’ singularly in this sense because its contents (phonemes) are
cosmologically pre-determined; (2) that the name has significance in either Assamese or
Karbi languages—a meaning that serves as a moral model for a normative aspiration,
expressing a wish that persons and names should become the same, singular thing over
time (this  also allows for  some flexibility  in arranging the pieces  of  a  name already
available);  (3)  that  the  name  is  not  shared  by  any  living  person  in  the  local  Karbi
community and in the village as a whole.11
43 This portion of the ceremonial is never taken lightly. Arguments often ensue between
patrilineal members and the bor bangthai, who has the unenviable duty of balancing the
multiple criteria needed to select the ‘right name.’ I recall at one oxus—for the newborn
daughter  of  my  host  sister—my  own  mother’s  name,  Maureen,  was  proposed  as  a
namesake  for  the  newborn girl.  But  the  bor bangthai immediately  shot  it  down:  ‘No
English  names  this  time!  Besides,  it  doesn’t  fit!’  After  that,  the  child’s  paternal
grandmother  intervened and suggested a  Hindi  name:  Sangamitra  (meaning:  socially
graceful, a friend who unites others). The bor bangthai and rongbong kathar agreed that the
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name fit  the criteria,  but the bor bangthai  further interjected that the name must be
pronounced in khati Oxomiya [pure Assamese] as ‘Xɔngɔmitrɔ.’ In another oxus (for the
child in Figure 6), an English name, Tina, was suggested and agreed upon, but the bor
bangthai interjected again saying that the name needed a locally meaningful suffix to
match another cosmologically pre-determined phoneme (mo’). The name finally chosen
was ‘Tinamoni,’ only a partial exonym.
44 Once a name is chosen, an unmarried boy from the child’s patriclan carries in a young
hen anointed with a couple drops of rice beer. The boy holds the hen up to the child's
head  to  "kiss"  it,  thus  sanctifying  membership  in  the  patriclan  through  physical
transmission,12 while the chief addresses the child by her newly given personal name and
clanic patronym. The rongbong kathar ,  in turn, addresses the child by both names and
then proceeds to tie a string around the child’s wrist and then one around the foot of the
hen (Figure 6), mimicking a marriage rite in the sense that the child is now ‘bound’ to the
patriclan and the tribe. Patrilineal men give collective toasts of rice beer and guzzle away.
The child is now of a patronym and thus belongs to the house, the patriclan, and to the
Karbi raiz (i.e., to a jati) as a fully transformed person. Mutual destiny is inaugurated as
such. But she is also now of her personal name—of a singular destiny that is much more




The rongbong kathar ties a string around the wrist of a child and is proceeding to tie a string around
the foot of a hen after the child’s name is given.
***
45 The entire oxus ceremonial  is  meant to enact a transformation in the child—from an
indeterminate vessel to a person socially and cosmologically constituted through acts of
Reflections on a Shared Name: Taboo and Destiny in Mayong (Assam)
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 12 | 2015
14
cutting, binding, containing, and naming. In that the society, in all its features, has to be
‘opened up’ for this to happen, protective rites are followed. They prevent jealous witches
and pollution (immanent to childbirth and necessary sacrifices) from coming in through
the  same door,  so  to  speak.  Purification,  through the  rite  of  bir  kilut and sacrificial
appeasement of the household deity, further enforces the protection of all socio-cosmic
domains (bodies, house, patriclan, raiz, village, tribe).
46  Name-giving, then, is the ultimate moment of transformation. It transubstantiates the
child in two ways. First, the address of a clanic patronym—in conjunction with the kiss of
a hen anointed by rice beer, and the strings that bind the child to the hen—transmits
what we might call, following Sahlins (2013), mutual being. The code of that mutuality is a
collective fate (bhagyo), originally divined by the rongbong kathar after the bir kilut rite,
which then flows cross-substantially through the rice beer that grounds clanic affiliation.
47 Second, the address of a personal name transmits to the child a singular destiny. Recall
the rather circuitous path that the name travels along until it unites with the child’s
body. For the bor bangthai,  a personal name is a puzzle. The particulate pieces of the
puzzle—a  given  collection  of  cosmologically  charged  phonemes—are  already  there,
predetermined by impersonal forces beyond human control. But he has to arrange them
syntagmatically in such a way that the paradigmatic result is a locally nonexistent name
that is also a meaningful model for the child to aspire to. Exonyms are one solution (see
above), but they do not always have an intuitively local meaning. Non-existing endonyms
are another, but they are hard to come by as Burha Mayong’s population grows and death
rates decline.
48 It  is  an  arduous  arbitration  that  leads  to  the  conclusion  that,  being  unique  and  so
carefully chosen, personal names are ‘cosmological singularities.’  Predetermined from
impersonal forces (lexemes hidden in the phonemes), the contents of a name are a priori.
Being phonetically fixed, a name always retains its connection to the impersonal forces
that constituted it (recall Prabin Da’s divination of forces from my own name). It is a fate
one cannot escape.
49 However, this does not mean that one’s singular fate is sealed in perpetuity. Indeed, the
code  and  substance  built  into  personal  name  is  entirely  amenable  to  individual
experiences and practices in real time. What one does in response to the impersonal
forces immanent in a name can change the course of that singular destiny. Here we are
on solid ground for the karmic theory that all lives are a combination of predestination
and  individual  actions  and  intentions—and  for  Marcel  Mauss’  (1979)  insistence  that
names are socially grounded categories of human understanding.
***
50 This brings us back to Mukunda Da. His fear of not knowing why his mita would speak his
name is, in this context, a rather practical one: not being able to control another body’s
actions and intentions when the same configuration of impersonal, cosmological forces
are present in each other. If his mita was gauche enough to break a taboo, then who
knows what he is capable of doing; their shared name might become disgraced, a badnam
so to speak (see Aditya Bharadwaj’s contribution in this volume).
51 The  cosmologic  here  turns  on  implications  of  conspecificity.  Similar  to  the  xará 
(namesakes)  of  Southern Mozambique  and Brazil  (Pina-Cabral 2010),  actions  of  name
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sharers are substantially fused; they are like kin who are co-responsible for the well-being
of their shared name and thus each other. But there is a major difference in Mayong; and
the difference has to do with the notion of substance name sharers share. Name sharers
are indeed conspecifics, but their consubstantiality is not—or rather, should not be—the
same as that of kin.
 
The kith and the kin, one more time: conspecificity and
destiny
52 To return to the puzzle of the name-sharing taboo, we are still left with the question of
why an interpellation of ‘friendship’ serves as a euphemistic substitution. To understand
what an idiom of friendship means in this context, we also must reckon what kinship is.
53  Kinship and friendship are tricky to delimit in Mayong, just as they are anywhere. Even
as  current  anthropological  theory  proposes  that  kinship  is  just  as  constructed  as
friendship (that is,  not necessarily a given of  birth and biological  relatedness),  there
nevertheless  remains  a  tendency  to  keep  the  two  conceptually  distinct  (see:  Bell  &
Coleman 1999, Desai & Killick 2010, Schneider 1980: 53, Testart 1999: 40–1). Perhaps in its
most  simplistic  formulation:  kinship  =  systematic,  jural  obligations while  friendship  =
unsystematic, non-jural sentiment. Yet I would contend that any attempt to define kinship
over-against  friendship  without  exploring  how  the  boundaries  between  the  two  are
defined and altered in practice—in the wake of embodied, critical events (cf. Das 1997) like
taboo transgression and containment—will always come up short.
54 Julian Pitt-Rivers (1973) goes to some length to illuminate an event-centric mediation of
kith and kin that I encourage here, first by posing a counterpoint to Meyer Fortes’ (1969)
restriction of the axiom of amity to kinship. By extending (indeed, returning) the meaning
of amity to one that includes ‘friendship,’ he makes a case quite similar to Sahlins (2013):
viz.,  birth  and  biology  have  no  bearing  on  what  kinship  really  is.13 For  Pitt-Rivers,
friendship and kinship are both modes of amiable conspecificity worked out in practice (
cf. Pitt-Rivers 1992: 232).
55  But, there are also two particular paradoxes of friendship that this amiable conspecificity
reveals. The first is that
though the favours of friends must be free, they must still be reciprocated if the
moral status quo is to be maintained […] [moreover] the disillusioned friend who
complains that his favours have not been reciprocated destroys his own reputation
by  implying  that  he  expected  they  should  be,  that  he  gave  them  only  out  of
calculation  in  expectation  of  a  return […]  [revealing]  that  the  sentiment  is  not
mutual. (Pitt-Rivers 1973: 97)
The second is that
moral equality is essential between unequals, for the only admissible reciprocity is
in sentiments. It must be accepted that my sentiments are of the same value as yours
even  though  I  cannot  demonstrate  them  by  material  equivalence.  (Pitt-Rivers
1973: 98)
For our purposes here, we can unite these two and state them more simply: friends are
conspecifics from the perspective of mutual and reciprocal sentiment, but by the same
token, this conspecificity fails in tautology because there are no grounds for measuring
equivalence in sentiment. Friends are thus like the primordial beings in Aristophanes’
discourse on love who, having been cut into two by Zeus, spend their lives searching for
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the unity in their other half that they once lost. All this is another way of saying that
friends do and do not have mutuality of being.
56 How, then, does this paradox play out for distinguishing kith and kin in Burha Mayong?
Names of address are an excellent place to explore this paradox, since they each (1) imply
different  notions  of  substance,14 and  thus  different  kinds  of  conspecificity;  and  (2)
constitute micro-events that provide a code for normative action and obligation. Consider
the following table:
 
Table 1: Names of address and their corresponding notions of substance in Burha Mayong
Names of Address Notion of Substance
Personal Name Impersonal Force (Cosmological Singularity)
Nickname Love (morom)
Kin Terms as Address Honor (xonman)
Title (uppathi) Fame/Recognition (xunam/bikhat)
Clanic Patronym Rice Beer (Cosmological Mutuality)
57 Let’s start with the middle three. Nicknames (moromiyal nam) are some of the most widely
used forms of address, especially in co-present interaction. They express sentiment in its
rawest form. In contexts of both kinship and friendship, they are given and used out of
love and affection. They are usually terms for ‘beauty’ (dhunu, moina, mamunu, majoni, aitu,
etc.). Although they can be used sarcastically, they most often express a sweet, relaxed,
and playful sentiment, and are used so often that addressors sometimes forget what the
addressee’s real name actually is.
58 Moving to the second: as with most societies throughout South Asia, one can make kin
out of anyone by addressing them in the terms of kinship. In Assam, one can address a
stranger  as  dada/kokai  (elder  brother),  bhaiti (younger  brother),  baideu/bhonti  (elder/
younger  sister),  deuta/ai  (father/mother),  khura  (father’s  brother),  mama (mother’s
brother), etc., depending on context and what expectations of obligation are implied. All
of these kin terms of address involve a notion of substance in honor and rank. (Note that
the kin terms for many seniors are also terms for divinity: deo/deu [god], ai [goddess].)
While one may use them casually, each moment of address ushers in a specific way of
acting  with  the  addressee  that  is  also  specific  to  kinship  relations.  No  metaphorical
extension here—addressing someone as kokai means that he is one’s elder brother in
terms of honor and rank, and that is how one should act with him. (The Mayong king is
always referred to as deuta, for example, and he is thus a literal father for everyone.) The
key point here is that addressing someone as kin is an attempt to build mutual being
through honorifics or ranked relations, even if there are no prior grounds for it.
59 A title (uppathi) is essentially the surname that one writes. (To find out what a stranger’s
title is, one asks ‘Ki likhe?’ [‘What do you write?’].) It is a minimal index of tribe/caste/
religious affiliation and functions most often as a means for grasping what rules to follow
with guests and strangers. If a person writes ‘Hussain,’ you shouldn’t feed her pork. If a
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person writes ‘Nath,’ you shouldn’t serve him alcohol. Moreover, in Burha Mayong it is
often the case that if one, for example, writes ‘Bangthai’ or ‘Kathar’—the respective terms
for ‘chief’ and ‘priest’ in Karbi society—one is not necessarily indexing affiliation to a
chiefly or priestly clan (kur in Karbi, phoid in Assamese). Clanic patronyms, which I will
describe below, are conceptually distinct from titles. Titles that are not clanic patronyms
are often given by someone else, but in either case they are a sign of fame and public
recognition (xunam, bikhat), emphasizing a particular feature of a person that should be
inherited by contemporaneous and future generations.  For example,  one of  my main
informants is a member of the Timung clan, and from childhood he wrote his clanic
patronym as his title. However, because of the fame and recognition he accrued with the
Karbi Students Union, he was given a new title—a chiefly one, ‘Bangthai’—which he then
passed on to his wife, siblings, and children as a new patronym.
60 None of these three names of address (nicknames, kin terms, titles) are marked. They are
the basis of the ordinary, unmarked interactional order among kith and kin. The notions
of  substance  they  entail  (love,  honor,  fame/recognition)  are  all  impersonal  forces not
specific to either domain (kinship or friendship), or to any specific person. The other two
names of address in the table above, however, belong to a marked form of address known
as namkari. And this is something very personal.
61 If I address someone by his personal name, I engage in an act similar to the devotional
practice of reciting the name of god in Assamese neo-Vaishnavism, or Ek Xorona Nam
Dhormo (‘Taking Shelter in the Name of One’). Naming calls forth the person into existence
in a cosmologically singular way, much like devotees call forth each and every aspect of
Krishna through his myriad names. As I demonstrated in the previous section, the notion
of substance called forth in a personal name is an amalgam of impersonal forces that
unite in a name that is locally non-existent and a unique moral model for a person to live
up to. Friends address each other by personal name quite casually. Kin, on the other
hand, tend to avoid using them, preferring nicknames instead.
62 A personal name stands in opposition to the name that indexes lineal kinship: a clanic
patronym. As I point out in note 11, a title may or may not be used as a generic patronym,
but among the Karbi of Burha Mayong a clanic patronym—whether used as a title or not—
is  something very static.  It  really  only appears  as a  term of  address  among kin and
between potential affines in contexts of marriage, when proscriptions about who can and
should marry whom become salient. For example, when my host sister eloped with her
future husband, clanic patronyms became a common term of address between their two
families. My sister is of the ‘Ronghang’ clan and her husband is of the ‘Timung’ clan.15 
Although this marriage is not taboo, in my host father’s eyes, his daughter was ‘marrying
down’ in rank. At first, he was unwilling to consent to the marriage. To appease my host
father, my host sister’s father-in-law brought a lau gourd (xorbong) filled with rice beer to
my host parents and entreated my host father as follows: ‘Please take this, Ronghang;
your daughter will be Timung.’ One could see this as a gift of peace-making between two
clans teetering between friendship and enmity. But the act was more. It preserved the
integrity of the clans, as well as an openness in a request for alliance and commensalism.
Rice beer is, indeed, the notion of substance that a clanic patronym calls forth. It is bio-
moral and references containment, surplus, and the heirloom strands of rice grain used
by families for generations. It links ancestors in a patriclan, binding them together as one
substantial being, just as it reaches out in commensal openness to potential affines (who,
upon becoming actual affines, are addressed as ‘guests’ [alohi]). Rice beer thus expresses
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cosmological mutuality in which a particular collectivity came, comes, and will come into
being.
***
63 Returning to the paradox of friendship, we can now note what kind of substances both
kith and kin truck in. Nicknames are common among friends. If their relationships are
really intimate but strained in rank, they might choose to use a kin term (or append a kin
term to a nickname). If they are stroking their friend’s ego, they might use a title. But in
using any of these they nevertheless stay in that gray area where friendship and kinship
bleed into one another, where substances of love, honor, and fame circulate. Yet, friends
never  use  clanic  patronyms  and  kin  avoid  using  personal  names.  Correspondingly,
namkari carves out two tentatively discreet zones for interactional address:  a zone of
independent  and  singular  beings  (reserved  mainly  for  friends)  and  a  zone  of
interdependent and mutual beings (reserved mainly for kin). Thus, in this context, the
paradox of friendship is disentangled—friends may indeed be conspecific in sentiment/
love, honor, and recognition, but they share these substances as independent rather than
mutual beings.
64 Of course, people who share personal names throw this formula out of whack. As William
Mazzarella points out in his contribution to this volume, ‘the aura of singularity [in a
personal name] […] depends on all the practices that protect that singularity from being
called into question or undermined.’ Uttering a name sharer’s name does just that: it
undermines the distinctive aura of a name, its cosmological singularity, by implying a
mutual being through the sharing of impersonal forces. Containment, through proscription
and the euphemistic utterance of mita, protects that aura by returning the name sharers
to a zone of independent singularities.
65 Still, something is amiss here. Name sharers share names despite the fact that they can
mitigate it by claiming to be friends. Their conspecificity in shared, impersonal forces
does not subside. Moreover, taboo containment only reinforces this fact since it is the
ground for there being a taboo in the first place.
 
Fate and togetherness
66 At this point we might ask: are name sharers in Mayong actually friends? As I mentioned
above, there are hardly any name sharers in Burha Mayong. They do, however, exist in
the Mayong kingdom as a supralocality. These name sharers, in general, do not like each
other.  This  dislike  is  not  expressed  as  enmity,  but  as  envy  and  petty  rivalry  with
entailments of casual competition, one-upmanship, and riposte—the building blocks of
‘big man’ (dangor manuh) politics throughout Northeast India. To the point, in the only
reference to the name-sharing taboo I have been able to find in regional ethnographic
literature—an  article  about  Garo  (Mande)  naming  practices  in  nearby  Meghalaya
(Hvenekilde  et al. 2000)—the  authors  reveal a  similar  phenomenon of  schismogenesis.
They draw on oral historical narratives that interpret the origins of this taboo in pre-
colonial ripostes between warriors of neighboring villages who happened to discover that
they shared a name and felt the need to challenge each other’s mettle.16 Speculative or
not, such an account emphasizes that the containing act of addressing a name sharer as
‘friend’ is not presumed to be true in both word and deed. Addressing someone as mita
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need not imply mutual sentiment and reciprocity in action at all, even if it does provide a
code for how the relationship should be handled.
67 Here we might take further insight from the analogous phenomenon of ‘ritual friendship’
(or ‘ritual brotherhood,’ ‘fictive kinship,’ etc.), dominant in Central India and Nepal. The
term used in  Nepal  for  such relationships  is  miteri (Messerschmidt 1982);  among the
Gabada of  southern Orissa,  the term is  moitr (Pfeffer 2001);  and in Chattisgarh,  phul-
phulwari (Desai 2010). In this phenomenon, bonds are intentionally created—most often
with people belonging to different castes or places—and both sentiment and reciprocity
are actively cultivated. So much so, that ritual friends start acting as if they were siblings,
and then pass that relation on to their own next of kin.
68 There is, however, an exception in this literature that is neatly apropos of our discussion.
In north-west Orissa there is a phenomenon of ritual friendship called, well, mita—almost
identical to the ‘rule of mita-mita’ in Mayong.17 Although the literature does not indicate
anything as strong as a taboo on shared names, the phenomenon of mita friendship in
Orissa is strikingly similar enough to warrant a full description:
This form of friendship is generally restricted to people having the same name by
birth. People believe that there is a special link between those who share a name.
However, the common name is also abandoned in favour of mita ‘friend.’ A Brahman
might perform a little ritual to underline the friendship, but in other cases people
regard  each  other  as  mita just  because  of  their  common  name.  They  may  also
address each other as mita, with or without a ritual […][and] mita must belong to
different  communities.  The  mita friendship  constitutes  a  relationship  between
equals  comparable  to  brothers.  However,  unlike  genealogical  brothers  any
difference  of  age  does  not  matter:  there  is  no  distinction  between  elder  and
younger brother with all its consequences (Skoda 2004: 171).
69  Here I want to extract two points from mita friendship in Orissa that help us to clarify
what friendship actually is in Mayong. The first is a similarity. This is that mita inevitably
belong to different communities. Given that so much work is put into preventing village-
based consociates from having the same personal name in Burha Mayong, the event of
discovering someone who shares your name is a contingent one that most often occurs
beyond the sectors of residence and close kinship. Effectively, name sharers are socially
distant strangers, brought together in coincidence. The second is a major difference. In
Orissa, mita friendship is comparable to brotherhood but disregards distinctions of age
and rank. But in Mayong, name sharers cannot avoid age due to the fact that a name also
has  a  temporal  unfolding,  a  particular  fate  built  into  it.  The  wish  for  telic  identity
between a name and a person, grounded in the non-aspirational fact that cosmologically
pre-determined forces constitute a name, makes a name’s temporality visible in a very
real  way.  And  since  my  name  sharer  is  unavoidably  either  my  junior  or  senior,  by
ushering him into existence viva voce I also usher in what I could be or could have been.
70  Name sharers thus have something very much in common with kin. They cannot escape
the  fact  that  they  are  bound  by  something  proximal  and  largely  pre-determined,
independent of their wishes. This sheer proximity of fate, in turn, creates an obligation to
care for a name, and this on the sole basis of  being stuck together in an ambiguous
situation (cf. Das 2013). Even if Mayongian name sharers see their relationship as one of
competition, they nevertheless acknowledge the fear that Mukunda Da spoke of. If my
name sharer is doing bad things, then that may very well affect me and what I think of as
my singular fate. Better to cut the name. As a consequence, if euphemistic friendship does
anything, it sets a record straight: friendship is a way to escape the ties that kinship
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binds.  Kinship is  unambiguous  mutual  destiny;  friendship is  not.  Addressing a  name
sharer  as  ‘friend’  ultimately  might  be  a  socially  necessary  act  of  misrecognition
(Bourdieu 1980), but the taboo and its containment nevertheless mitigate the uncanny
feeling that occurs when one has an occasion to say: there is my name, but there is not
my body.
 
An untying that binds
71 Effectively, the taboo I broke wasn’t so minor after all. It boils down to the fact that my
future is something I am not exclusively responsible for. Nor is it clear that my life is
uniquely my own. It is, in fact, a real cosmological possibility that Sean Penn and I share
something important. Calling him by name ushers a potential shared destiny into being,
implying that his bad and good deeds are potentially my own and vice versa. My future
might be his present and his past might be my present.
72 Ostensibly, had I ‘cut the name’ and addressed him as my friend, I would have created
between us a kind of ‘close distance’ (see Mazzarella 2003: 256–57, 2006: 496). In other
words, I would have also introduced a nominal, but very real and substantial, difference:
even though our embodied destinies might be intertwined, I should treat him otherwise.
His embodied actions and intentions are of his own lifeworld, which may be dizzyingly
close to my own, but nevertheless remain independent—just distant enough. A word, a
single word, thus unties a fate.
73 Still and all, this is an untying that binds together all the Seans of the world. Every time I
write Sean Penn’s name in this paper, I repeat the transgression and raise the stakes. I
can’t escape him; I can’t laugh him off as ‘my other brother Sean.’  Something of our
mutuality forever remains in that aspects of me are unfolding in him and vice versa. For
my part, it remains uncertain whether this is good fortune or bad luck.
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NOTES
1. As per Gell’s analysis, his transgression revealed a connection between general food taboos
and a specific taboo on eating self-killed game among the Umeda. It also brought into sharp focus
the absence of a familiar repertoire of bodily techniques: ‘With opened eyes, I was enabled to see
the significance of the entire absence of auto-cannibalistic habits among the adult population,
the  absence of  such things  as  nail-biting,  moustache-chewing,  the  swallowing of  dried nasal
mucus, etc.—practices which among ourselves vary in degree of niceness without ever attaining
the status of major sins’ (Gell 1979: 135).
2. Mayong  is  a  multi-ethnic  village  cluster  and  customary  kingdom,  approximately  forty
kilometers west of Guwahati on the southern banks of the Brahmaputra River. The ethnographic
material in this article derives mainly from the village of Burha Mayong, a predominantly Karbi
village on the western border of the kingdom.
3. For a thorough survey of this literature, see Valeri (2000: Chapter 2).
4. The logic of this double-sided rigidity is as follows. On one hand, as in Saul Kripke’s (1980)
famous  formulation,  proper  names  are  ‘rigid  designators’  because  the  baptismal  events  that
usher  them  into  use  necessarily  fix  their  reference  once  and  for  all—across  all  subsequent
moments of use in context and in all ‘possible’ (read: hypothetical or counterfactual) worlds. In
one of his examples, if there is a hypothetical world where Hitler was never born, we can still
imagine a baptismal speech event where someone could say ‘Hitler is the person who was never
born in our world,’  and the name ‘Hitler’  would still  refer inflexibly to itself  (a non-existent
person). On the other hand, verbal taboos evince what Fleming (2011: 151–53, passim) calls ‘rigid
performativity,’  meaning  that  the  ability  for  tabooed  words  to  do  things  in  their  explicit
utterance ‘does not depend upon contextual factors or ‘felicity conditions,’  like the speaker’s
intentions or the appropriateness of the social context, to have its effectiveness. It requires only
the occurrence of the taboo form’ (Fleming 2011: 160). For example, to report that so-and-so said
‘I now pronounce you man and wife’ does not accidentally marry anyone whereas its ceremonial
utterance—a felicity condition—allows the statement to do exactly what it says. Yet, to verbally
report that so-and-so said the word ‘fuck’—or to articulate it as I do here—transgresses the same
taboo on uttering the ‘f-word’ as when so-and-so originally uttered it.
5. Veena Das (this issue) argues that names can foreshadow death in subdued ways. Her two
examples show how this can occur through both intentional utterances and intentional silences
beyond  formal  systems  of  naming.  In  the  first  example,  Das’  informant  describes  how  she
intentionally breaks a name avoidance taboo by speaking the name of her deadbeat husband—in
verbal interactions with others—so as ‘to wish him a bit of death everyday by taking his name’ [cf
. Trawick 1992: 95 and Das 1968 on spousal name utterance taboos in South India and Bengal,
respectively].  In  the  second example,  an  informant  named Sheela  reveals  to  Das  that  she  is
unable to utter the name of a man who once violated her, even silently to herself: ‘I cannot even
say it aloud to myself. It is like I am holding something in me, tight as a fist, a coiled snake, and if
that came out, the world would be thrown into chaos (duniya utthal putthal ho jayegi).’
6. See Guenzi (2012) for an ethnographically informed discussion of the Indic concept of bhagya,
which she felicitously translates as ‘allotted share.’  Moreover, the connection of cosmological
fate to one’s personal name is not without comparative instances. Julian Pitt-Rivers describes of
first names in Andalusia: ‘A person’s first name is sometimes called his gracia [grace]’ (1992: 226).
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Cf. the examples of nominal personhood and shield names collected in vom Bruck & Bodenhorn
(2006).
7. Being  headless,  and  thus  lacking  what  we  might  call  ‘cephalic  personhood,’  murkond are
violently jealous beings who need the mouths, eyes, ears, and noses of others to satisfy their
passions.
8. This same cosmologic is what makes Iñupiat and Inuit kinship a function of name giving and
name sharing rather than of parenting and birth (Sahlins 2013: 3).
9. In Northeast India this term signifies ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race’ more than ‘caste’ (see Cantlie 1984).
10. In Karbi cosmogony—as detailed in the oratorical Mosera rite—humans were born from fowl
eggs. The sin of egg sacrifice, here, unfolds from a proscription against killing the congeners of
one’s  own tribe,  and not  from killing  or  sacrificing  a  living  being.  There  is,  however,  some
overlap here with the anti-sacrificial tenets of Assamese Vaishnavism, the rituals of which the
Karbi of Burha Mayong also partake in.
11. As a testament to the senior chief’s acumen and memory: among the living in Burha Mayong,
I know of only one instance of a shared name—Rupeshor Kro and Rupeshor Timung—which is an
exception that proves the rule, since the latter is the junior chief (deka bangthai) and is always
addressed as such and never by name.
12. Kissing here is  analogous to  touching (Gregory 2011),  a  form of  transmitting positive  or
negative substances. In this case, the transmission is almost certainly one of positive kinship
substance. First, there is the anointing of rice beer (the quintessential clanic substance). Second
is the kiss itself, vicariously given by the unmarried boy from the child’s patriclan who holds the
hen. Almost an inverted mirror image of the name-sharing taboo, this rite reveals the corporeal
sharing and transmission of what unites kin independently of anyone’s wishes or sentiments.
13. For Sahlins (2013: 24), however, the ‘mutuality of being’ that sufficiently defines kinship need
not be amiable in practice. If I read him correctly, Sahlins would hesitate lumping ‘friendship’ in
with ‘kinship’—first owing to the fact that not all societies around the world have a concept of
friendship, and second because ‘mutuality of being’ allows for the possibility of kin to be both
friends and enemies. To rephrase satirist Robert Benchley: all friendship is relative, although all
relatives are not friends.
14. By ‘substance’ here I am referring to a kind of essence (xar in Assamese), which may or may
not be material.
15. To  further  substantiate  my  argument  that  titles  are  conceptually  distinct  from  clanic
patronyms, my host family uses (‘writes’) the title ‘Kathar’—referencing a priestly affiliation—
while their actual clanic patronym, ‘Ronghang,’ references a kingly affiliation. I was often told
that  since I  am now part  of  their  family,  I  am of  the clan of  kings.  The point  is  that  clanic
patronyms can be used as titles, but not all titles are clanic patronyms.
16. Meghalaya, interestingly, has its own regional fame as a place with a hyper-eclectic naming
repertoire, where one finds personal names as idiomatic, singular, and referentially foreign as
‘Latrine,’ ‘Submarine,’ ‘Fiction,’ ‘Helpme,’ etc. (see: http://namasutra.blogspot.in/2014/04/mirth-
in-meghalaya.html, accessed February 6, 2015). We might see this as an alternative solution to
having to confront name sharers,  a kind of ‘creative refusal’  (Graeber 2013) that consciously
rejects the cosmological determinism of naming practices in neighboring areas like Mayong.
17. Oriya and Assamese (Oxomiya) are linguistically related, but it is uncertain what historical or
cultural connection the two phenomena share. It seems that they both belong to a permutational
continuum of cultural practices concerning friendship, identity, and nominal substance. Current
research into historical affinities that stretch from South India, north to the Himalaya, and east
into Burma reveal that the stark cultural differences often attributed to Northeast Indian peoples
are very much a contemporary phenomenon (see Chatterjee 2013).
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ABSTRACTS
This article explores the cosmological entailments of a minor verbal taboo in Mayong (Central
Assam).  In  brief,  individuals  who  share  personal  names  are  forbidden  from  addressing  or
referring  to  each  other  by  name,  and  instead  must  interpellate  each  other  as  mita (friend).
Through an analysis of names in acts of sorcery and magic, a baptism ceremonial, and nominal
modes of address in Mayong, this article demonstrates how confronting a person with a shared
name is tantamount to confronting one’s own singular destiny in another body and another time.
Alongside  an  ethnographic  theorization  of  taboo  that  bridges  the  unmentionable  and
untouchable  divide,  this  article  further  demonstrates  how  the  euphemistic  norm  of  address
between name sharers reframes the distinction between kinship and friendship as a matter of
with whom one can and should share a mutual destiny.
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